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FINALLY FREED OR INFINITELY 
DETAINED? THE NEED FOR A CLEAR 
STANDARD OF FINALITY FOR 
REINSTATED ORDERS OF REMOVAL 
Abstract: Circuits are currently split as to whether reinstated orders of removal 
are final orders of removal. The resolution of this circuit split and related legisla-
tive ambiguity has far-reaching implications for the rights of the 150,000 or more 
unauthorized immigrants who enter the United States each year. Reinstated or-
ders of removal are a means by which the United States government can more 
rapidly deport individuals who reenter the country after having been previously 
deported. On July 29, 2016, in Guerra v. Shanahan, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit declared that reinstated orders of removal are not 
final orders of removal. As a result of that decision, the Second Circuit recog-
nized that individuals detained under reinstated orders of removal have the right 
to a bond hearing. In contrast, on July 7, 2017, in Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that reinstated 
orders of removal are final orders of removal. The Ninth Circuit’s decision there-
fore rejected the proposition that individuals subject to reinstated orders of re-
moval are entitled to a bond hearing. This Note argues that Congress should ex-
plicitly announce that reinstated orders of removal are not final orders of removal 
in order to safeguard the rights of individuals seeking protection in the United 
States. This Note further argues that, unless and until Congress acts on this issue, 
statutory and regulatory interpretation should lead future courts to the conclusion 
that reinstated orders of removal are not final orders. 
INTRODUCTION 
Deyli Noe Guerra first came to the United States from Guatemala in April 
1998, fleeing death threats.1 When Guerra fled to the United States, he did so 
without authorization and was detained by Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) shortly thereafter.2 After an immigration judge ordered Guerra 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Guerra v. Shanahan (Guerra I), No. 14-CV-4203, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 
2014), aff’d, Guerra v. Shanahan (Guerra II), 831 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2016). Guerra’s paternal uncle was 
threatening retribution against him after Guerra’s cousin, who was pregnant with Guerra’s child, 
committed suicide. Id. 
 2 See id. (detailing Guerra’s entry into the United States in April, and the entry of his order of 
removal in May of 1998). Entry without authorization, or, as it is known more colloquially, illegal 
immigration, is the process of entering the United States without some form of permission to enter the 
country. See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez II), 882 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting 
that an individual who was in the United States illegally had “entered the United States without apply-
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removed in May of 1998, he was removed to Guatemala in April of 2009.3 
Upon his return to Guatemala, Guerra faced continued threats.4 Fearful for his 
life, Guerra returned to the United States without authorization and was appre-
hended by ICE later in 2009.5 ICE reinstated Guerra’s prior order of removal, 
and he was removed to Guatemala in March of 2010.6 Guerra then entered the 
United States for a third time, and was arrested in New York in May of 2013.7 
After ICE became aware that Guerra had re-entered the country a second 
time, it again reinstated his prior order of removal and detained him.8 While 
Guerra was detained, he expressed his fear of returning to Guatemala.9 An asy-
lum officer determined that Guerra had a reasonable fear of returning to Gua-
temala after conducting a reasonable fear interview.10 Guerra’s case was then 
transferred to an immigration judge to consider his eligibility for withholding 
of removal, a process by which he could avoid deportation by proving his life 
would be threatened in Guatemala.11 While those proceedings were underway, 
                                                                                                                           
ing for admission or parole”); Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (noting that Guerra had entered the country 
without authorization). 
 3 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. Removal proceedings are the government’s method of de-
porting individuals who do not have authorization to be in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
(2012) (providing for the procedure the Attorney General uses to remove an unauthorized individual 
from the United States). 
 4 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. In addition to the continued threats from his paternal uncle, 
Guerra was also subject to threats from a gang member named Cachorro after Guerra started dating 
Cachorro’s ex-girlfriend. Petitioner-Appellee’s Brief at 7, Guerra II, 831 F.3d 59 (No. 15-504-cv). 
Guerra also faced threats from a group of drug traffickers who, having killed Guerra’s maternal uncle 
while Guerra was in the United States, thought he had returned to Guatemala to avenge his uncle. Id. 
at 6–7. 
 5 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1; see infra notes 59, 61–62. (explaining the role of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in immigration matters). 
 6 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. Any individual who the government had previously re-
moved from the United States, who reenters the country can be subject to a reinstated order of remov-
al. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2018). Reinstating a former order of removal is a more rapid way for the gov-
ernment to remove an individual and requires only that an ICE officer determine that there was a pre-
vious removal order that was issued, that the individual before them is the individual identified in that 
order, and that the individual reentered the United States. Id. § 241.8(a)(2)–(3). 
 7 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. State authorities arrested Guerra for driving while intoxi-
cated. Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. (indicating that an asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear interview with Guerra, 
which requires that he first have alleged a fear of returning to Guatemala). 
 10 Id. Asylum officers conduct reasonable fear interviews within ten days of an individual ex-
pressing a fear of removal to a specific country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The interview is a non-
adversarial proceeding, after which the asylum officer must decide whether the individual’s fear is 
reasonable. Id. § 208.31(c). If the asylum officer decides that a person’s fear is reasonable, then the 
immigrant’s case is transferred to an immigration judge. Id. § 208.31(e). If the asylum officer decides 
that a person’s fear is not reasonable, then that person can appeal the decision to an immigration 
judge. Id. § 208.31(g). 
 11 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. Withholding of removal is a form of relief that individuals 
can seek if they are facing “ordinary” or reinstated orders of removal, which allows them to avoid 
removal to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened. Kurtis A. Kemper, Necessity 
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Guerra requested a bond hearing, which the immigration judge denied on mul-
tiple occasions.12 Guerra subsequently filed a habeas petition in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking that the 
court order the immigration judge in his case to hold a bond hearing.13 The 
District Court granted Guerra’s habeas petition, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on appeal.14 Guerra was freed on bond 
on New Year’s Eve, 2014, after 359 days in ICE detention.15 
Raul Padilla-Ramirez fled to the United States from El Salvador in 1999 
to escape a life of sexual assaults, threats, and physical attacks.16 When Pa-
dilla-Ramirez entered the United States, he did so without authorization.17 By 
2006, Padilla-Ramirez had married and started a family in the United States, 
and his child was born a U.S. citizen.18 Eventually, ICE became aware that 
Padilla-Ramirez was in the United States and initiated removal proceedings 
against him in September of 2006.19 During his initial removal proceedings, 
Padilla-Ramirez applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.20 An immigration judge 
                                                                                                                           
and Sufficiency of Evidence Corroborating Alien’s Testimony to Establish Basis for Asylum or With-
holding of Removal, 179 A.L.R. FED. 357 (2002). 
 12 Petitioner-Appellee’s Brief, Guerra II, supra note 4, at 7–8. Bond hearings are a method of 
determining whether an individual subject to immigration detention should be released on bond or 
further detained. See generally Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory 
Immigration Detention, 65 HASTING L.J. 363 (2014) (arguing in favor of bond hearings every six 
months for detained immigrants, while noting that bond allows individuals subject to immigration 
detention to be freed from custody). 
 13 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61. Habeas petitions, more formally known as petitions for writ of habe-
as corpus, serve numerous functions in the American legal system, providing for post-conviction chal-
lenges to arrest or trial procedures, or to grant a bond or bail hearing. See Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “habeas corpus” and detailing its many types and func-
tions). 
 14 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61; Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. 
 15 Petitioner-Appellee’s Brief, Guerra II, supra note 4, at 10. 
 16 Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez I), 180 F. Supp. 3d 697, 698 (D. Id. 2016); see 
Opening Brief of Petitioner at 2, Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d 826 (No. 16-35385) (detailing Padilla-
Ramirez’s suffering at the hands of his extended family and a gang that “effectively rule[s]” El Salva-
dor). In his brief to the Ninth Circuit, Padilla-Ramirez detailed a life that included abandonment, 
threats, attacks, and sexual assaults in his home country, all of which prompted his attempts to come 
to the United States. Opening Brief of Petitioner, Padilla-Ramirez II, supra, at 2. 
 17 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 698. 
 18 See Excerpts of Record, Volume I of II at 14, Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d 826 (No. 16-35385) 
(detailing Padilla-Ramirez’s family in 2016, which included his fifteen-year-old child who is a United 
States citizen). Padilla-Ramirez’s children are citizens by birthright citizenship as provided in the 
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born . . . in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.”). 
 19 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 698–99. 
 20 Id. at 699. Individuals qualify for asylum if they can show past persecution, or a “well-founded 
fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion in the [individual]’s country of citizenship.” Kemper, supra note 11 (citing 
8 U.S.C. § 1158). Withholding of removal is a form of relief from removal that is available to those 
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denied Padilla-Ramirez’s requests, but allowed him to voluntarily depart the 
United States instead of being removed.21 Padilla-Ramirez did not depart the 
United States by the deadline in his voluntary departure order, so the order au-
tomatically converted to an order of removal.22 ICE removed Padilla-Ramirez 
to El Salvador in February of 2010.23 
Padilla-Ramirez reentered the United States and was discovered by ICE 
while he was being held in the Ada County Jail in Boise, Idaho on a state crim-
inal charge.24 After Padilla-Ramirez’s state charge was dropped, ICE took cus-
tody of him and reinstated his order of removal.25 While he was detained, Pa-
dilla-Ramirez sent a letter to ICE detailing his fear of returning to El Salva-
dor.26 Subsequently, Padilla-Ramirez had a reasonable fear interview, where an 
asylum officer determined that Padilla-Ramirez did have a reasonable fear of 
returning to El Salvador.27 Padilla-Ramirez’s case was then transferred to an 
immigration judge to determine whether he was eligible for withholding of 
removal.28 Padilla-Ramirez requested a bond hearing in front of the immigra-
tion judge, who determined that she did not have jurisdiction to grant bond 
                                                                                                                           
who can show that the threat that the individual would face is a threat to life or freedom “because of 
the [individual]’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231). The United Nations Convention Against Torture is an international 
treaty, which the United States has ratified, that forbids removal of an individual to a country where 
they will be more likely than not be subject to torture, requires withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c). If an immigration judge grants an individual withholding of removal, that withholding 
only prevents their removal to a specific country, and not from the United States generally. Id. 
§ 208.16(f). 
 21 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699. Voluntary departure orders are orders that an immi-
gration judge can enter instead of an order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1). An individual subject 
to a voluntary departure order must leave the United States within 120 days, or the order converts to 
an order of removal. See Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699 (noting the process of converting 
voluntary departure orders to orders of removal). 
 22 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699. 
 23 Id. When ICE acts to remove individuals from the United States, the agency must remove them 
to the specific countries listed in their removal orders. See Deportation, USA.GOV (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.usa.gov/deportation [https://perma.cc/3YWY-7FUM]. The government removes most 
individuals through the use of government-run flights, although some are removed by ground trans-
portation. Id. 
 24 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699. The record in Mr. Padilla-Ramirez’s case never 
identified the charges he faced in Idaho. See Answering Brief of Respondent-Appellees at 3, Padilla-
Ramirez II, 882 F.3d 826 (No. 16-35385) (noting that Padilla-Ramirez was detained on “a number of 
state criminal charges”); see also Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829 (referring to the reason for Pa-
dilla-Ramirez’s detention in Idaho as “a state criminal prosecution”); Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 
3d at 699 (noting that Padilla-Ramirez was transferred to ICE custody after the dismissal of “pending 
state criminal charges”); Opening Brief of Petitioner, Padilla-Ramirez II, supra note 16, at 3 (noting 
that Padilla-Ramirez was in “criminal custody” prior to the dismissal of his “criminal proceedings”). 
 25 Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699. 
 26 Opening Brief of Petitioner, Padilla-Ramirez II, supra note 16, at 3. 
 27 Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829. 
 28 Id. 
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because Padilla-Ramirez was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).29 Pa-
dilla-Ramirez then filed a habeas petition, which the United States District 
Court for the District of Idaho denied, and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed that denial.30 Padilla-Ramirez was 
eventually granted a bond hearing under then-standing Ninth Circuit prece-
dent, which required bond hearings for noncitizens that had been detained for 
six months under either § 1226 or § 1231.31 
Current federal law provides for the detention of unauthorized immigrants 
through two different statutory schemes.32 One of those statutory schemes, 
§ 1226, regulates detention before an order of removal becomes final, and re-
quires bond hearings for most individuals detained thereunder.33 The other 
statutory scheme, § 1231, addresses detention after an order of removal has 
become final, and does not provide for bond hearings.34 In that context, the 
Padilla-Ramirez and Guerra cases raise the question: are reinstated orders of 
removal final and therefore unreviewable?35 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of immigration law and practices 
in the United States, details the current provisions of federal law governing 
immigrant removals, and provides a general overview of statutory interpreta-
tion.36 Part II examines the two recent federal appellate decisions that created 
the circuit split on the issue of reviewability of reinstated orders of removal 
and the far-reaching implications of those decisions.37 Part III argues that Con-
gress should resolve the current split by explicitly providing for the reviewabil-
ity of reinstated orders of removal, and that proper analysis of the current 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 828 (affirming denial of the habeas petition in Padilla-Ramirez I); Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 
F. Supp. 3d at 698 (denying Padilla-Ramirez’s habeas petition seeking a bond hearing). 
 31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Padilla-Ramirez v. Culley, No. 17-1568 (U.S. May 
16, 2018). Under Ninth Circuit precedent at that time, noncitizens detained for more than six months 
were entitled to a bond hearing, regardless of what statute the government detained them under. Id. 
(citing Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015)). In the time since the government grant-
ed Padilla-Ramirez’s bond, the Supreme Court has overturned the Ninth Circuit decision that author-
ized bond in his case. Id. (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847–48 (2018)). 
 32 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (providing for detention of an individual “pending a decision on 
whether [that individual] is to be removed from the United States”), with id. § 1231(a) (providing for 
detention of an individual “during the removal period”). 
 33 See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (providing that an individual who is not subject to a final order of 
removal may apply to a have a bond hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether that 
person should be released on bond, and at what amount bond should be set). 
 34 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (providing that the Attorney General “shall detain” individuals re-
movable under that section). 
 35 See Opening Brief of Petitioner, Padilla-Ramirez II, supra note 16, at 2 (recognizing the first 
issue for review as whether a reinstated order of removal was administratively final); Petitioner-
Appellee’s Brief, Guerra II, supra note 4, at 14 (noting that the issue before the court was whether 
Guerra’s reinstated order of removal was administratively final). 
 36 See infra notes 39–137 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 138–184 and accompanying text. 
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statutory system leads to the conclusion that reinstated orders of removal are 
reviewable.38 
I. THE IMMIGRATION FRAMEWORK AND THE APPLICATION OF  
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has been shaped by immigration since its founding.39 
The overwhelming majority of Americans are decedents of individuals who 
came to this country seeking the opportunity for a better life, away from the 
wars, oppression, or famine in their former countries.40 As the United States 
has grown, so too has its need to establish and enforce immigration laws to 
protect the country and its people both physically and economically.41 It is 
against that backdrop of tension between America’s foundation upon immi-
grants, and its need to have and enforce immigration laws, that the current le-
gal framework came into being.42 In turn, it is that very framework that has led 
to the current split on the finality of reinstated orders of removal, which leaves 
the rights of over one hundred and fifty thousand individuals per year hanging 
in the balance.43 
This Part explains both the historic and current immigration system in the 
United States, the current process of removal procedures, and the tools of stat-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See infra notes 185–213 and accompanying text. 
 39 See generally U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HISTORY.COM (2009), https://www.history.com/
topics/u-s-immigration-before-1965 [https://perma.cc/3GZJ-G3VZ] (detailing immigration trends in 
the United States from the 1500s until 1965). 
 40 See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC 
ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (2010), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BSV7-SUNP] (noting that only 0.9% of the United States population in 2010 was either 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, and that less than 0.1% was Native Hawaiian); see, e.g., HISTO-
RY.COM, supra note 39 (noting that “many immigrants came to America seeking greater economic 
opportunity, while some, such as the Pilgrims in the early 1600s, arrived in search of religious free-
dom”). 
 41 See generally D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through 
History, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/
30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history [https://perma.cc/U2ZV-
H3QP] (detailing United States immigration law from 1790 until the present). 
 42 See SARA MCELMURRY ET AL., THE CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOB. AFFAIRS & THE BIPARTISAN 
POLICY CTR., BALANCING PRIORITIES: IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND PUBLIC SAFETY  
4–5 (2016), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/oct16_immigrationandnational
securty_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSS7-VRP7] (noting the need to balance interests in national 
security with economic, cultural, and educational interests when considering immigration law re-
forms). 
 43 See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadow of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
203 n.117 (2017) (noting that U.S. immigration authorities reinstated 159,634 orders of removal in 
2013 alone). Compare Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez II), 882 F.3d 826, 831–32 (9th Cir. 
2017) (analyzing the current framework of immigrant detention and determining that reinstated orders 
of removal are administratively final), with Guerra v. Shanahan (Guerra II), 831 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 
2016) (analyzing the same framework but coming to the opposite conclusion as the Padilla-Ramirez II 
court). 
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utory interpretation that courts use to determine what rules apply to individuals 
subject to reinstated orders of removal.44 Section A sets out a brief history of 
immigration policy and practices in the United States.45 Section B details the 
means and procedures by which the government removes an individual for the 
first time.46 Section C explains the different procedures applicable to individu-
als who reenter the United States after being removed.47 Section D provides a 
brief overview of methods of statutory interpretation relevant to courts’ deter-
minations of what law is applicable to individuals subject to reinstated orders 
of removal.48 
A. A Brief Overview of the History of Immigration in the United States 
Throughout America’s history, immigration has played a central role in 
shaping the country’s identity and political landscape, encompassing moments 
of the nation’s unity and division.49 In its earliest days, the United States em-
ployed extremely restrictive immigration and naturalization policies.50 Ameri-
can immigration policy long favored individuals from certain regions of the 
world, while explicitly or implicitly barring others from immigrating.51 Begin-
ning with the Second World War, the United States began utilizing immigration 
policy to provide protection for refugees of foreign wars.52 Since the late 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See infra notes 49–137 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 49–58 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 59–105 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 106–131 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 132–137 and accompanying text. 
 49 See, e.g., United States and the Holocaust, 1942–1945, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM 
(2017), https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007094 [https://perma.cc/L742-
YRX4] (detailing establishment of the War Refugee Board to facilitate the acceptance of a greater 
number of Jews fleeing the Holocaust); Trump’s Executive Order: Who Does the Travel Ban Affect?, 
BBC (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38781302 [https://perma.cc/ETD8-
VUZJ] (detailing the policy of halting immigration from various countries where the Islamic State 
was active); Cohn, supra note 41 (providing a general overview of various immigration policies in the 
United States from the 1700s to the present). 
 50 See Cohn, supra note 41 (detailing the Naturalization Act of 1790, which allowed only “free 
white persons” of “good moral character” to become United States citizens, and the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882, which barred immigration from China and prevented Chinese residents of the Unit-
ed States from being naturalized). At other times in American history, Congress designed laws to limit 
immigration by individuals from Asian countries and bar immigration by “anarchists, beggars, and 
importers of prostitutes.” Id. (detailing the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 1917 and the Anarchist Exclu-
sion Act of 1903). 
 51 See id. (detailing laws that, at certain times in American history, completely barred Chinese 
immigration, allowed for a greater number of immigrants from countries with a high number of indi-
viduals already in the United States, and established immigration quotas based on the hemisphere 
from which individuals immigrated). 
 52 See id. (noting that the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 provided visas to over 200,000 refugees and 
that the 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act provided for the migration of South 
Vietnamese allies of the United States and that Congress later expanded the law to include refugees 
from Cambodia and Laos). 
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1990s, much of American immigration law has been passed in response to un-
authorized immigration and the threat of terrorism.53 
As of 2018, immigrants come to the United States in one of three ways: 
by obtaining a form of permanent authorization to be in the country, by obtain-
ing temporary authorization to be in the country, or by entering the country 
without authorization.54 Permanent permission to enter the United States can 
be obtained by naturalization or through receipt of lawful permanent resident 
status.55 The various I-94 visa programs, which allow individuals to enter the 
United States for work, school, or to visit, are one way to receive temporary 
permission to enter the country.56 Entering the United States without authoriza-
tion has become one of the most hotly contested issues in contemporary Amer-
ican political discourse.57 The increased focus on unauthorized immigration 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. (noting changes in the law in 1996, 2002, and 2006 motivated by terrorism and unau-
thorized immigration). 
 54 See Philip Martin, Trends in Migration to the U.S., POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (2014), 
https://www.prb.org/us-migration-trends/ [https://perma.cc/PGR2-J77X] (identifying the options 
available for entry into the United States as “a front door for immigrants, a side door for temporary 
visitors, and a back door for the unauthorized”). 
 55 See Lawful Permanent Residents, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2017), https://www.dhs.
gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents [https://perma.cc/PDJ7-YGCP] (detailing the 
process for becoming, and rights of, a lawful permanent resident); Citizenship Through Naturaliza-
tion, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (2013), https://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/
citizenship-through-naturalization [https://perma.cc/G6R9-BLUK] (detailing the naturalization pro-
cess). A total of 1,183,505 individuals received lawful permanent resident status in the United States 
in fiscal year 2016, marking the highest number to receive that status since 1991. Persons Obtaining 
Lawful Permanent Resident Status: Fiscal Years 1820 to 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(2016), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table1 [https://perma.cc/4SUQ-
5GSY]. In fiscal year 2016, of the 972,151 naturalization applications filed, 753,060 individuals be-
came naturalized U.S. citizens. Petitions for Naturalization Filed, Persons Naturalized, and Petitions 
for Naturalization Denied: Fiscal Years 1907 to 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table20 [https://perma.cc/5UBA-AUX4]. 
 56 See Immigrate, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/
immigrate.html [https://perma.cc/K3X5-ETJS] (detailing long-term visas available); Visitor Visa, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visitor.html#overview 
[https://perma.cc/RJQ8-RXDG] (detailing short-term visas available to visitors to the United States). 
I-94 Visas are issued to a broad range of individuals including temporary workers and their families, 
students, exchange visitors, diplomats and other representatives, temporary visitors for work or pleas-
ure, individuals in continuous transit through the United States, commuter students, fiancées of U.S. 
citizens and their children, and spouses and children of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. 
See Nonimmigrant Admissions by Class of Admission: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2015, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (2015), https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015/table25 [https://
perma.cc/G2HJ-PEQE]. In fiscal year 2015, the most recent year for which data is available through 
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), there were 181,300,000 admissions into the country 
through some form Visa program, 76,638,236 of which were through I-94 Visas. Id. DHS does not 
track the unique entries into the country through these visa programs, so the number of individuals 
entering through visa programs is likely lower than the total number of admissions. See id. 
 57 Compare Immigration Reform, THE OFFICE OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (2017), https://
www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/9K9J-38HG] (reproducing the 
campaign website of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, which detailed her proposals to enact 
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could be the result of a plethora of causes, including increasing numbers of 
such immigrants over the last thirty years, concerns regarding terrorism, and 
recent economic downturns both domestically and abroad.58 
B. “First Instance” Removal Proceedings 
The Executive Branch, through the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), is responsible for the enforcement 
of immigration laws enacted by Congress.59 The DHS, through divisions such 
as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE, acts as the “front-line” en-
forcer of immigration laws.60 Individuals found at or near the border by CBP 
are most often removed from the country through a process known as expedit-
ed removal.61 Individuals who make it beyond the immediate border region or 
                                                                                                                           
immigration reform to create an easier path to citizenship, maintain immigration policies enacted by 
the Obama Administration, end detention of families, close some detention centers, and invest $15 
million in immigrant-integration programs), with DONALD J. TRUMP FOR PRESIDENT, INC., IMMIGRA-
TION REFORM THAT WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN 2–4 (2016) https://assets.donaldjtrump.
com/Immigration-Reform-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4HZ-Y976] (detailing then-presidential 
candidate Donald Trump’s proposals to build a wall that Mexico would pay for, end birthright citizen-
ship, triple the number of ICE Officers, defund sanctuary cities, and detain “illegal aliens” until they 
could be removed). As of February 6, 2018, the President of the United States was threatening the sec-
ond government shutdown of 2018 over what he viewed as uncorrected issues with U.S. immigration 
policy. See Thomas Kaplan, Congress, Tuning Out Trump’s Threats, Focuses on Compromise, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2018, at A19 (detailing comments by the President that he would “love to see a shut-
down if we don’t get this [immigration] stuff taken care of”). 
 58 See Jeffery S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, As Mexican Share Declined, U.S. Unauthorized Immi-
grant Population Fell in 2015 Below Recession Level, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 25, 2017), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-
population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level [https://perma.cc/4QUS-N78N] (detailing a rise in the 
total number of unauthorized immigrants from 3.5 million in 1990 to a peak of 12.2 million in 2007); 
see, e.g., Cohn, supra note 41 (noting changes to U.S. immigration laws from 1996 to 2006 motivated 
by “concerns about terrorism”). Although unauthorized immigration did spike from 1990 to 2007, 
more recent trends show that the number of unauthorized entries per year is on the decline. See Passel 
& Cohn, supra (indicating that eleven million unauthorized entries into the United States occurred in 
2015). 
 59 See Koh, supra note 43, at 187–88 (detailing the control of the immigration process by depart-
ments of the Executive Branch). 
 60 See id. at 188 (describing Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE as DHS “sub-
agencies” that employ “front-line immigration enforcement officers”); Who We Are, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/BS3U-Z2R5] 
(detailing ICE’s mission of identifying, apprehending, detaining, and removing individuals, and inves-
tigating “the illegal movement of people and goods”); About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. 
(Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.cbp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/FJ87-LKXC] (detailing CBP’s mission 
of “keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the United States while facilitating lawful international 
travel and trade”). 
 61 See Koh, supra note 43, at 194–95 (detailing the practice of expedited removal). Expedited 
removal is a process by which the government can remove individuals seeking entry at the border, or 
who have entered the country but are found near the border, who lack proper entry documents, or 
present false documents. Id. at 195, 197. Expedited removal does not provide for any hearing or re-
view, and can be accomplished by an immigration officer. Id. at 195–96. Immigration officials can 
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who overstay their temporary permission to be in the country face enforcement 
actions by ICE.62 ICE carries out its enforcement actions by seeking out indi-
viduals that they determine are in the country illegally or by issuing detainer 
requests to local law enforcement.63 
Once an individual is apprehended by ICE, the person’s case is trans-
ferred to the DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review.64 Individual 
cases are then assigned to an immigration judge within the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review.65 Removal proceedings before an immigration judge 
may take place in the form of in-person proceedings, or may be conducted via 
video or telephone conference.66 While a person’s removal proceedings are 
ongoing in the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Attorney General 
may detain that person pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.67 Pursuant to § 1226, the 
Attorney General has the power of discretionary detention of certain classes of 
individuals, whereas others are subject to mandatory detention, pending a de-
termination of their removability.68 Section 1226(a) provides for the discre-
                                                                                                                           
utilize expedited removal to remove individuals who are at the border or who are found within one 
hundred miles of an international border after having entered within the last fourteen days. Id. at 197. 
 62 See What We Do, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/
overview [https://perma.cc/X6ER-PBA9] (noting that “the majority of immigration enforcement work 
for ICE takes place in the country’s interior”). 
 63 See Joseph O’Sullivan, Chief Justice Asks ICE Not to Track Immigrants at State Courthouses, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/chief-justice-asks-
ice-not-to-track-immigrants-at-state-courthouses [https://perma.cc/6TAQ-C4JN] (detailing actions 
that ICE takes to detain individuals if detainer requests are not honored by local law enforcement 
agencies); see also Detainer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “immigration 
detainer” as “a notice by the DHS to a federal, state, or local law-enforcement agency to . . . request 
that the agency retain custody of that person for additional time to allow the DHS time and opportuni-
ty to assume custody and determine whether the person is subject to removal from the United States”). 
 64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012) (dictating the role of immigration judges in proceedings); infra 
note 65 (noting that immigration judges serve in the Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
 65 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (providing that immigration judges preside over all removal proceed-
ings). Through the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, the Executive Office for Immigration Re-
view employs nearly 330 immigration judges, sitting in fifty-eight locations in the United States. Of-
fice of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/E42U-5UF4]. Immigration judges are not 
Article III judges, but rather members of the Executive Branch who perform functions similar to those 
of an administrative law judge. Shobia Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the 
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (2014) (detailing the position of immigration judges). 
Immigration judges are responsible for presiding over removal, deportation, and exclusion proceed-
ings, and reviewing credible fear determinations made by asylum officers. See id. (explaining the 
responsibilities of immigration judges and noting that in 2013, immigration judges handled 193,350 
cases). 
 66 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(2). 
 67 Id. § 1226; see Guerra v. Shannan (Guerra I), No. 14-CV-4203, 2014 WL 7330449, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (detailing the detention of individuals “while removal proceedings take 
place” under § 1226). 
 68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), (c) (detailing when the Attorney General may arrest or detain an indi-
vidual and when the Attorney General must arrest and detain certain individuals); see also Guerra I, 
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tionary detention of individuals in removal proceedings.69 Most individuals 
detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing before an immi-
gration judge to determine whether they should remain detained.70 Certain 
classes of individuals—those enumerated in § 1226(c)—are not entitled to a 
bond hearing, and the Attorney General must detain those individuals during 
their removal proceedings.71 
During removal proceedings, individuals are afforded procedural protec-
tions in addition to the right to a bond hearing.72 These protections include the 
right to an attorney, the right to examine and present witnesses and evidence, 
and the right to contest the government’s claims.73 During removal proceed-
ings, individuals that the government is attempting to remove may avoid entry 
of an order of removal in one of two ways.74 First, if they have applied for ad-
mission into the country, they may show that they are “clearly and beyond 
doubt entitled to be admitted” and that they are not inadmissible on other 
grounds.75 Second, individuals can show by clear and convincing evidence that 
they were lawfully present in the country at the time of their apprehension.76 
The government, on the other hand, has the burden to show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the individual is removable under a provision of federal 
                                                                                                                           
2014 WL 7330449, at *1 n.1, *2 (describing detention under § 1226(a) as “discretionary detention” 
and detention under § 1126(c) as “mandatory detention”). 
 69 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *2 (describing § 1226(a) as “the ‘discretionary detention’ 
provision”). 
 70 See, e.g., Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829 (recognizing that individuals detained under 
§ 1226 “may request an additional bond hearing before an [immigration judge]”); Guerra II, 831 F.3d 
at 62 (recognizing that individuals detained under § 1226 “may request a bond hearing before an [im-
migration judge]”); Straker v. Jones, 986 F. Supp. 2d 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that indi-
viduals detained under § 1226(a) are “entitled to a bond hearing”). 
 71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (mandating the detention of individuals who are inadmissible or 
deportable based on various sections of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227). Section 1226(c) does not permit 
bond hearings, and individuals subject to detention under the section are only eligible for release in lim-
ited circumstances. See id. § 1226(c)(2) (allowing for the release of individuals covered under 
§ 1226(c)(1) if it is necessary to protect certain people and if the Attorney General determines that the 
individual is not dangerous to others or property and will likely appear at their hearing). 
 72 See Wadhia, supra note 65, at 5–6 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2012)) (detailing protections 
afforded to individuals in ongoing removal proceedings). 
 73 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012) (providing individuals in removal proceedings with rights 
related to the conduct of proceedings). Section 1229a’s right to an attorney only applies if it is not at 
the expense of the government. Id. This means that individuals must either pay for their own attorney 
or rely on pro bono legal aid. See id. (providing a right to counsel “at no expense to the Govern-
ment”); Wadhia, supra note 65, at 6 (noting that the counsel is only guaranteed at “no expense to the 
government”). Although § 1229a does provide certain rights to individuals facing removal, those 
guarantees have been criticized as lacking the same force as the rights afforded to criminal defendants. 
See Wadhia, supra note 65, at 6 n.31 (collecting sources detailing the shortcomings of procedural 
safeguards in the removal process based on the view of such proceedings as civil matters). 
 74 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2). 
 75 Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A). 
 76 Id. § 1229a(c)(2)(B). 
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law.77 Individuals may voluntarily depart the country at any time prior to the 
completion of their removal proceedings, so long as they are not deportable 
because they are a terrorist or have committed an aggravated felony.78 
Removal proceedings can conclude with the issuance of an order of re-
moval by the immigration judge, the voluntary departure by the individual fac-
ing removal, or a finding that the individual is not removable.79 At the end of a 
removal proceeding, the immigration judge may, in certain circumstances, is-
sue a voluntary departure order.80 When individuals are to voluntarily depart, 
either prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings or in response to an order 
by an immigration judge, they are given a certain amount of time in which to 
leave the country and they may be required to post a bond.81 Alternatively, if 
individuals are found to not be removable—either because they were admitted 
as a result of their removal proceedings or because they were accidently placed 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Id. § 1229a(c)(3). 
 78 See id. § 1229c(a)(1) (providing that immigration judges cannot allow individuals deportable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(4)(B) to voluntarily depart the country). The statutes regard-
ing immigrant detention and removal do not explicitly define “aggravated felony,” simply stating that 
individuals “convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission [are] deportable.” Id. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); see id. § 1101 (providing no definition for “aggravated felony”). The statutes do 
specifically enumerate terrorism-related grounds for deportability, specifically by treating conduct that 
would disqualify someone from admission to the United States as grounds for deportability. See id. 
§ 1227(a)(4)(B) (treating some inadmissibility grounds listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) as deportability 
grounds). The terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility are broad and allow the Attorney General 
to exercise significant discretion in determining what individuals qualify as terrorists. See, e.g., id. 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) (providing that a person may be inadmissible if “the Attorney General . . . 
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, [the individual] is engaged in or is likely to engage after 
entry in any terrorist activity”). 
 79 See Koh, supra note 43, at 189–91 (detailing the possible resolutions of removal proceedings). 
 80 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) (allowing for immigration judges to enter “an order granting volun-
tary departure in lieu of removal”). 
 81 Compare id. § 1229c(a)(2)(A), (a)(3) (stating that the Attorney General “may” require a bond 
from individuals who wish to voluntarily depart before the end of removal proceedings, and that such 
individuals must depart the country within 120 days), with id. § 1229c(b)(2), (b)(3) (requiring a bond 
from individuals subject to a voluntary order of removal issued by an immigration judge, and requir-
ing those individuals to depart the country within sixty days or be subject to an order of removal). 
When an immigration judge allows an individual to voluntarily depart, the immigrant has a 120-day 
window in which to depart, at which point the voluntary departure order becomes an order of removal. 
See Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 699 (detailing the conversion of a voluntary departure order 
into an order of removal). Before leaving the United States under a voluntary departure order, an indi-
vidual and ICE complete part of a “Voluntary Departure and Verification of Departure Form.” Immi-
gration Bond: How to Get Your Money Back, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. 
(2016), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/immigration-bond-how-get-your-money-back [https://perma.
cc/ZQK7-MN5Z]. After departing the country, an individual must take the form to a U.S. consulate or 
embassy, where it is completed by a state department official, thereby allowing the individual to re-
cover the posted bond. See id. 
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in removal proceedings even though they were legally present in the country—
then they are allowed to remain in the United States.82 
When an immigration judge enters an order of removal against an indi-
vidual, that individual has the right to ask for reconsideration of the order of 
removal and the right to appeal that order to the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals.83 In some circumstances, individuals may also be allowed to seek relief 
for want of due process by filing in federal court.84 The first step for an indi-
vidual seeking review of an order of removal is an appeal to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals, which serves as the appeals division of the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review, reviewing appeals from the determinations of 
immigration judges.85 The Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review any matter decided by the immigration judge in the former proceed-
ings, and has the power to affirm, reverse, or remand those decisions.86 When 
an individual wishes to have the immigration judge’s decision reconsidered 
after review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, the individual must file a 
motion to reconsider within thirty days of the administrative finality of that 
decision.87 The motion must specify any errors that the individual believes oc-
curred in the initial removal proceeding.88 Even if all those levels of review 
find that the individual is removable, relief from an order of removal can be 
pursued by making a claim for asylum, for withholding of removal under fed-
eral law, or for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.89 
Applications for asylum and applications for withholding of removal are 
related, yet distinct, types of relief that an individual facing removal can 
seek.90 Asylum claims are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1158, which requires an 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (noting that the only two arguments that individuals can make against 
removal are that they should be admitted to the country, or that they were in the country legally). 
 83 Id. § 1229a(c)(4), (6). 
 84 See Koh, supra note 43, at 191–92 (detailing the rise in the use of due process claims to seek 
relief in immigration proceedings and the existence of procedural rights in those proceedings). For an 
immigrant to seek review in federal court, the order of removal against the individual must be admin-
istratively final. Id. 
 85 See Wadhia, supra note 65, at 5 (describing the Board of Immigration Appeals as the “adminis-
trative appellate division” of the Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
 86 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018) (outlining the powers and jurisdiction of the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals). 
 87 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of the Real ID Act, 
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 563 (2008) (detailing options available to individuals facing an order of remov-
al). For purposes of this Note, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is referred to as the “Convention Against Torture,” as 
it is throughout federal statutes and regulations. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. 
 90 See Kemper, supra note 11 (noting the differences between claims for asylum and applications 
for the withholding of removal). 
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individual to show persecution in the past or a “well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion in the [individual]’s country of citizen-
ship.”91 Withholding of removal requires a higher bar of proof, that of a “clear 
probability of persecution.”92 Withholding of removal also requires a showing 
that the threat an individual would face is a threat to life or freedom “because 
of the [individual]’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion.”93 In addition to their procedural differences, 
asylum and withholding of removal grant different remedies to individuals fac-
ing removal.94 
Individuals can also obtain relief from removal by seeking withholding of 
removal under the Convention Against Torture.95 The Convention Against Tor-
ture is an international treaty, requiring signatory countries to, inter alia, pre-
vent torture from occurring in their own jurisdictions, refuse to remove or ex-
tradite individuals to a country where they would be tortured, and criminalize 
and prosecute torture occurring domestically.96 Pursuant to the treaty, individu-
als in the United States who can show that it is more likely than not that they 
will be tortured if they are returned to their country of origin can obtain with-
holding of removal.97 Nevertheless, individuals who are granted withholding 
of removal under the Convention Against Torture can still be removed to any 
other country besides the country where they would be tortured.98 If an immi-
gration judge denies withholding of removal an individual can appeal that de-
termination to the Board of Immigration Appeals.99 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158); see Michael McGarry, A Statute in Particularly Serious Need of 
Reinterpretation: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception to Withholding of Removal, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 209, 214 (2010) (outlining burden and elements of an asylum claim). 
 92 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984); McGarry, supra note 91, at 214. 
 93 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Kemper, supra note 11. 
 94 See McGarry, supra note 91, at 214 & n.39 (collecting authorities explaining that relief under 
withholding of removal only prevents removal to that specific country, whereas relief under asylum 
could result in the grant of lawful permanent resident status). 
 95 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (detailing the process and burden to apply for withholding of removal 
under the Convention Against Torture). 
 96 See Kristen B. Rosati, The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Self-Executing Trea-
ty that Prevents the Removal of Persons Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 26 DENV. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 533, 534, app. I (1998) (detailing the limits placed on the United States as a sig-
natory country of the Convention Against Torture). The Rosati article provides the full text of the 
Convention Against Torture. Id. 
 97 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). 
 98 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E) (providing for the removal of individuals to countries other than 
those designated in their removal orders); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f) (noting that, in both withholding under 
§ 1231 and withholding under the Convention Against Torture, the government is not prevented from 
“removing an [individual] to a third country other than the country to which removal has been with-
held”). 
 99 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). 
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Once an immigration judge issues an order of removal against an individ-
ual, the order of removal becomes “administratively final” when either the 
Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the order or the appeals period expires 
and the person’s options for avoiding removal are exhausted.100 At that point in 
the process, the individual is held by ICE, which remains responsible for the 
person’s detention and eventual removal.101 That detention is governed by 8 
U.S.C. § 1231.102 Like § 1226, which governs detention pending a determina-
tion of removability, § 1231 also provides for both mandatory and discretion-
ary detention once an individual is subject to a final order of removal.103 Sec-
tion 1231(a)(2) provides for the mandatory detention of individuals subject to a 
final order of removal during the “removal period,” which is a ninety-day peri-
od following the administrative finality of an order of removal.104 Individuals 
who are not removed within the ninety-day “removal period” may remain de-
tained subject to discretionary detention, which is governed by § 1231(a)(6).105 
C. Reinstated Orders of Removal 
Following the removal of an individual from the United States through 
the process detailed above, many of those individuals seek reentry into the 
country through both legal and illegal means.106 To reenter the country legally, 
individuals that were previously removed from the country can either wait the 
time prescribed by their removal order and apply for lawful permanent resident 
status or a visa, or submit an I-212 Form to request a waiver of the inadmissi-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)) (describing the 
prerequisites for administrative finality). 
 101 See Wadhia, supra note 65, at 5 (detailing the execution of orders of removal by ICE). 
 102 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii); see Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 830 (explaining that the 
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 apply to an individual beginning on the date of administrative finality 
of an order of removal, the date of a judicial stay of removal, or on the date the government releases 
an individual from non-immigration detention, whichever is latest). 
 103 Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829–30 (describing discretionary and mandatory 
detention provisions of § 1231), with supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (detailing discretion-
ary and mandatory detention under § 1226). 
 104 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C); Guerra I, 2017 WL 7330449, at *2 n.3; see Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 
F.3d at 829 (describing § 1231(a)(2)’s provision for mandatory detention). 
 105 Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829–30. Section 1231(a)(6) affords individuals detained under 
that section more protections than those detained under § 1231(a)(2), given the length of their deten-
tion. See id. at 830 (citing Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011)) (recognizing that 
“individuals detained under § 1231(a)(6) are entitled to the same procedural safeguards against pro-
longed detention as individuals detained under § 1226(a)”); Guerra I, 2017 WL 733049, at *2 n.3 
(recognizing that individuals detained beyond the removal period are entitled to “periodic custody 
reviews”). 
 106 See, e.g., MARK GRIMES ET AL., UNIV. OF ARIZ. NAT’L CTR. FOR BORDER SEC. & IMMIGRA-
TION, REASONS AND RESOLVE TO CROSS THE LINE: A POST-APPREHENSION SURVEY OF UNAUTHOR-
IZED IMMIGRANTS ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 10 (2013), http://www.borders.arizona.edu/
cms/sites/default/files/Post-Apprehension-Survey-REPORT%20may31-2013.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8FW5-VFHP] (noting the numbers of individuals that attempt reentry after removal). 
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bility period and be allowed to apply for the aforementioned status or visa 
sooner.107 Due in part to the length and complexity of the legal reentry process, 
many individuals that were previously removed seek reentry through unauthor-
ized means.108 When a previously removed individual is found to have illegally 
reentered the United States, the government has the option to prosecute that 
individual for the crime of illegal reentry.109 Alternatively, the government can 
reinstate the reentered individual’s previous order of removal pursuant to 
§ 1231, accelerating the removal process.110 Although illegal reentry prosecu-
tions occur in federal districts near the border, the more common result faced 
by previously removed individuals that reenter the country without authoriza-
tion is that their former order of removal is reinstated and they are removed 
again.111 The use of reinstated orders of removal increased exponentially be-
tween fiscal years 2005 and 2013, with the frequency with which they were 
employed increasing nearly 270%.112 
When first authorized during the height of McCarthyism in the 1950s, the 
practice of reinstating orders of removal was designed to streamline the pro-
cess of removing previously removed communists, saboteurs, and anar-
chists.113 Despite the initial narrow scope of reinstated removal orders, just two 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (detailing conditions under which an individual can reenter the 
country after removal). 
 108 See Koh, supra note 43, at 203 (citing GRIMES ET AL., supra note 106, at 9) (noting that “a 
2011–2012 survey of those apprehended at the border found that individuals with longstanding ties to 
the United States were twice as likely to plan an attempt to reenter the country, and that people with 
families in the United States were two to three times more likely to do so”); Ilona Bray, After Remov-
al: Possibilities for Reentry to the U.S., NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/after-
removal-possibilities-reentry-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/N42Y-JVUB] (noting that, after deporta-
tion, an individual can be barred from reentering the United States for a period of five to twenty years, 
or indefinitely). 
 109 See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (defining the crime of illegal reentry, and prescribing punishments 
including a fine, or up to twenty years imprisonment, or both). 
 110 See id. § 1231(a)(5) (prescribing the procedure for reinstating an order of removal against a 
previously removed individual). 
 111 See Koh, supra note 43, at 203 n.117 (noting that in the fiscal year 2013, the government rein-
stated 159,634 orders of removal, compared to 18,498 prosecutions for illegal reentry). 
 112 Id. at 204 (citing AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE 
GROWTH OF SUMMARY DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), https://www.american
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/removal_without_recourse.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X4AK-9Y9B]) (noting the increase in the use of reinstated removal orders between 2005 and 
2013). 
 113 See Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, 1012 (1950) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 156) (repealed 1952) (allowing for the reinstatement of orders of removal against “criminals, prosti-
tutes, procurers or other immoral persons, anarchists, subversives and similar classes,” who unlawful-
ly reentered the United States after removal). Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 over 
the veto of President Truman, during the height of McCarthyism. See 96 CONG. REC. 15,722–23 
(1950) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (detailing opposition to the President’s veto); see, e.g., id. at 
14,853 (statement of Sen. Rankin) (supporting initial passage of the Internal Security Act; stating “if it 
takes a concentration camp for these traitors, then I am for sending them to concentration camps; if it 
takes deportation, then I am in favor of sending out a boatload a week from now on. We are not going 
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years after their inception as a practice, Congress expanded the applicability of 
reinstated orders of removal to other classes of unauthorized immigrants.114 
The scope of reinstated orders of removal remained relatively unchanged until 
Congress expanded the scope again as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.115 In addition to Congress’s chang-
es to the applicable scope of reinstated orders of removal, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) also made changes to the regulations governing 
the procedure for reinstating such orders.116 One of the most significant of 
those procedural changes allowed ICE officers to reinstate an order of removal 
without an immigration judge’s oversight or review.117 
As the law stands in 2018, when the government seeks to reinstate an or-
der of removal against a previously removed individual, the officer seeking to 
reinstate the order need only show three elements.118 First, the officer must 
show that there was a previous removal order.119 The officer also must show 
                                                                                                                           
to permit this gang of Reds to destroy the American Government or the American way of life, or 
wreck our Christian civilization”). 
 114 See Lee J. Teran, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and Other Tales of Chal-
lenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 538, 658 (2012) (detailing provisions of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) that allowed the reinstatement of orders of re-
moval against individuals who the government had previously removed because of crimes, false doc-
uments, or security concerns). Even with those broadening changes, reinstatement of removal under 
the INA still required an individual to appear before an immigration judge, who alone had the power 
to reinstate an order of removal. See id. at 658 & n.413 (citing Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 
F.3d 484, 499 (9th Cir. 2007); 8 C.F.R. § 242.23 (1991)) (noting that previous INS “regulations pro-
vided for the issuance of an order to show cause, hearing before an immigration judge, and an order 
issued by the judge”). 
 115 See Teran, supra note 114, at 659–60 (citing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 305(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009) (detailing 
changes to the process for reinstating orders removal made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). Specifically, Congress expanded the applicability of reinstat-
ed orders of removal beyond their limited former scope to apply them to any individual who had pre-
viously been subject to an order of removal. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2000) (allowing for the 
reinstatement of an order of removal against any individual who “reentered the United States illegally 
after having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal”), with Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 5, § 242, 66 Stat. 208 (repealed 1996) (allowing reinstatement of 
orders of removal against smugglers, criminals, individuals who failed to register with immigration au-
thorities or falsified immigration documents, and individuals who posed a threat to national security). 
 116 See Teran, supra note 114, at 659 (making note of changes to reinstated orders of removal that 
allowed “low level officers” to reinstate orders of removal). INS has since been eliminated, and its 
former role is now filled by ICE, CBP, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. See Did 
You Know?: The INS No Longer Exists, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.
uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists [https://perma.cc/7G98-9JT7] 
(noting the transfer of the INS’s previous duties to those agencies). 
 117 See Teran, supra note 114, at 659 (identifying regulatory changes that confirm that individuals 
subject to reinstated orders of removal do not have a right to a hearing before an immigration judge). 
 118 8 C.F.R. 241.8(a)(1)–(3); see Koh, supra note 43, at 204 (detailing the three elements required 
for reinstatement); Wadhia, supra note 65, at 7 (detailing the same three elements). 
 119 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(1). 
2454 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2437 
that the individual seeking to be removed was the subject of that removal or-
der.120 Finally, the officer must show that the individual was removed and sub-
sequently reentered the United States.121 Because the forms of relief from re-
moval under a reinstated order of removal are limited, the entire removal pro-
cess under a reinstated order—from detention to deportation—can take as little 
as a few hours.122 Although 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) specifically states that a re-
instated order of removal is “not subject to being reopened or reviewed,” and 
that the person sought to be removed “is not eligible and may not apply for any 
relief under” the immigration laws, exceptions exist.123 
The most general exception to § 1231(a) allows individuals subject to re-
instated orders of removal to have access to a reasonable fear determination.124 
In order to be referred to an asylum officer for a reasonable fear determination, 
an individual must express a fear of being removed to the country specified in 
that individual’s order of removal.125 The asylum officer must then conduct an 
interview with the individual, which must take place within ten days of referral 
to the asylum officer.126 The interview, as contemplated in its governing regu-
lation, is non-adversarial, and the individual seeking withholding of removal is 
afforded the right to representation, and to present evidence and witnesses.127 
If, after the interview, the asylum officer determines that the individual did not 
state a reasonable fear, the individual has the right appeal that determination to 
an immigration judge for review.128 If, on the other hand, an asylum officer 
finds that an individual subject to a reinstated order of removal did state a rea-
sonable fear of returning to the country that the individual was ordered re-
turned to, the asylum officer transfers the case to an immigration judge to de-
termine whether the individual’s removal should be withheld.129 The proceed-
ings before the immigration judge, known as “withholding-only proceedings,” 
cannot be used to challenge the underlying removal order, but instead only ad-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. § 241.8(a)(2). 
 121 Id. § 241.8(a)(3). 
 122 Teran, supra note 114, at 661 (noting that, in the context of Mexican nationals arrested near 
the U.S. border with Mexico, reinstated removal can take “a matter of hours”); see Koh, supra note 
43, at 204–05 (describing how there is “little room for further review” of reinstated orders of removal, 
and commenting that the avenues for protection from removal are “extremely narrow”). 
 123 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); see 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(d)–(e) (recognizing exceptions for individuals 
who have applied for status adjustments under various laws, or who allege that they fear returning to 
the country they are ordered removed to). 
 124 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). 
 125 Id. § 208.31(b). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. § 208.31(c). 
 128 Id. § 208.31(g). 
 129 Id. § 208.31(e). The statute governing reinstated removal proceedings specifically forbids the 
Attorney General from removing an individual to a country where that individual’s “life or freedom 
would be threatened.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 
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dresses the claim for withholding of removal.130 If the immigration judge de-
nies an individual’s request for withholding of removal, that individual can 
appeal the determination to the Board of Immigration Appeals.131 
D. Overview of the Means of Judicial Interpretation of Statutes 
Because the finality of orders of removal is governed primarily by two 
differing statutory schemes, much of the divergence between the Second and 
Ninth Circuits arises from differing statutory interpretation.132 Courts under-
taking statutory interpretation begin with the language of the statute as written 
by Congress.133 If no satisfactory determination as to the meaning of a statute 
can be reached by examining the language of the statute itself, courts then look 
to federal regulations interpreting and applying those statutes for guidance.134 
In certain situations, administrative interpretations of federal regulations are 
granted deference by courts, although only if the regulation directly addresses 
the statutory vagueness and is based on a permissive statutory construction.135 
If courts need to look beyond the text of the statute and the regulations inter-
preting the statute, they then examine the structure of the ambiguous statutory 
scheme to determine the meaning of the ambiguous statute.136 Every U.S. Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61–62 (identifying the proceedings before an immigration judge as 
withholding-only proceedings and noting their narrower scope). 
 131 See Guerra I, 2017 WL 7330449, at *3 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e)) (noting that an “immigra-
tion judge’s withholding determination can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals”). 
 132 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 830 (detailing the statutory interpretation employed by the 
Ninth Circuit); Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62–63 (noting the contrary statutory interpretation used by the 
Second Circuit). 
 133 See Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (noting, while in-
terpreting the Lanham Act, that “statutory construction must begin with the language employed by 
Congress”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (noting, while interpreting provi-
sions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that “[the Court’s] starting point must be the lan-
guage employed by Congress”). 
 134 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 831 (examining federal regulations after finding that the 
statutory text did not answer the reviewability question, but before the court “conduct[ed] [its] own 
[independent] review of the statute”); Guerra II, 832 F.3d at 63–64 (addressing the government’s 
arguments regarding the use of federal regulations to answer the question of the reviewability of a 
reinstated order of removal). 
 135 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63–64 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (noting that the limits of regulatory and administrative deference require 
the examining court to consider whether the administrative interpretation is on point, and whether the 
underlying regulation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute”). Under Chevron, courts 
must defer to agency interpretations of law, so long as those interpretations are reasonable. See San-
ford Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 
B.C. L. REV. 757, 759 (1991) (detailing the crux of the Supreme Court’s Chevron holding). 
 136 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 832–33 (analyzing the overall statutory structure of re-
moval proceedings, after discussing the text of the statute); Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62–63 (addressing 
the structure of the statutes in question after having examined the language of the statute). 
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cuit Court has recognized that questions of statutory interpretation are re-
viewed de novo on appeal.137 
II. DIFFERING STANDARDS OF FINALITY RESULTING IN DIFFERING  
RIGHTS FOR UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS 
Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals are split as to 
the reviewability of reinstated orders of removal, and consequently as to 
whether individuals subject to such orders of removal have the right to a bond 
hearing.138 That split provides some individuals who are subject to reinstated 
orders of removal the right to a bond hearing, while denying that right to others 
in the same situation.139 The current split is only likely to grow as more courts 
address this question without Supreme Court precedent on the issue, or an ex-
plicit statutory clarification.140 
This Part discusses the cases that created the circuit split over the reviewa-
bility of reinstated orders of removal.141 Section A details the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Guerra II, which recognized that an individual who is subject to a 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F.3d 162, 167 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that statutory 
interpretation is subject to de novo review); Ingham Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. United States, 874 F.3d 1341, 
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (same); Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 887 F.3d 986, 990 
(10th Cir. 2017) (same); Ela v. Destefano, 869 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2017) (same); LNV Corp. 
v. Outsource Servs. Mgmt., L.L.C., 869 F.3d 662, 666 (8th Cir. 2017) (same); Winebow, Inc. v. Capi-
tol-Husting Co., Inc., 867 F.3d 862, 867 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. 
v. Pesiri, 863 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 2017) (same); Buntin v. City of Boston, 857 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir. 
2017) (same); U.S. ex rel. Carson v. Manor Care, Inc., 851 F.3d 293, 302 (4th Cir. 2017) (same); 
Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, L.L.C., 843 F.3d 1062, 1064 (5th Cir. 2016) (same); Castro v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 429 (3rd Cir. 2016) (same); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 
F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); see also Hearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining “hearing de novo” as a hearing that gives “no deference to a lower court’s findings” or is 
“conducted as if the original hearing had not taken place”). 
 138 See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez II), 882 F.3d 826, 834–35 (9th Cir. 2017) (cit-
ing Guerra v. Bible (Guerra II), 831 F.3d 59, 62–64 (2d Cir. 2016)) (rejecting, expressly, the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion in Guerra II and indicating that the Supreme Court should step in to “harmonize 
the resulting split”). 
 139 Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 832 (reasoning that because individuals subject to 
reinstated orders or removal are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), they are not entitled to a 
bond hearing), with Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 60–61 (reasoning that because individuals subject to rein-
stated orders or removal are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), they are entitled to a bond hear-
ing). This split causes divergent outcomes in identical cases because, as circuit-level decisions, they 
are only binding on the lower courts in that circuit. See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 
1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.D.C. 1987) (Ginsburg, J.) (explaining that “[b]inding precedent for 
all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of 
appeals for that circuit”). 
 140 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 831 (noting that the “statutory definition of finality does 
not dictate a clear answer” to the question of which section applies to individuals subject to reinstated 
orders of removal); Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62 (noting that the question of whether § 1226 or § 1231 
applies to individuals subject to reinstated orders of removal was one of first impression). 
 141 See infra notes 146–184 and accompanying text. 
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reinstated removal order but has ongoing withholding-of-removal proceedings is 
entitled to a bond hearing.142 Section B examines the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Padilla-Ramirez II, which declined to recognize a right to a bond hearing for 
individuals subject to reinstated orders of removal.143 Section C makes note of 
decisions and the reasoning used by other district courts that have determined 
whether reinstated orders of removal are final.144 Section D details the wide-
spread impact of the currently murky status of entitlement to bond hearings.145 
A. The Second Circuit’s Affirmance of the Southern District of New York’s 
Decision that Reinstated Orders of Removal are Reviewable 
While Guerra’s application for withholding of removal was pending be-
fore an immigration judge, that immigration judge refused to hold a hearing to 
consider releasing Guerra on bond, citing a lack of jurisdiction to do so.146 
Guerra then filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York seeking immediate release from custody, or 
alternatively, a bond hearing.147 Guerra contended that he was being detained 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and was therefore entitled to a bond hearing.148 
The government argued that because the underlying order of removal could not 
be challenged, that order constituted a final order of removal.149 The govern-
ment further argued that because the underlying order of removal was final, 
Guerra was being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and was thus not entitled to 
a bond hearing.150 
In Guerra I and Guerra II, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, respectively, held that individuals who are subject to reinstated 
orders of removal but have ongoing withholding-of-removal proceedings are 
entitled to bond hearings.151 The Guerra courts identified that the question be-
fore them was whether an order of removal that was reinstated against an indi-
                                                                                                                           
 142 See infra notes 146–160 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 161–169 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 170–179 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 180–184 and accompanying text. 
 146 See Petitioner-Appellee’s Brief, Guerra II, supra note 4, at 7–8 (noting that “the government 
repeatedly refused to consider evidence to release Guerra on bond”). 
 147 Guerra v. Shanahan (Guerra I), 2014 WL 7330449, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see Guerra II, 831 
F.3d at 61 (indicating that Guerra argued his detention violated due process, which if found by the 
court would have required his release). 
 148 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *3 (“Guerra thus asserts that his detention is governed by 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that he is therefore entitled to a bond hearing.”). 
 149 See id. (noting the government’s argument that reinstated orders or removal are administra-
tively final “because such an order ‘is not subject to being reopened or reviewed’”). 
 150 See id. (detailing the government’s proposed conclusion that Guerra was detained under 8 
U.S.C. § 1231). 
 151 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61; Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. 
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vidual with a pending application for withholding of removal was administra-
tively final.152 The courts noted that if such reinstated orders of removal were 
administratively final, then individuals subject to those orders were detained 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and are therefore not entitled to a bond hearing.153 
In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit examined the language of 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a) and noted that the statute applied to individuals awaiting a 
determination of actual removal, not just theoretical removability.154 The court 
also reasoned that, while Guerra was clearly removable as a result of the rein-
stated removal order, his ongoing withholding proceedings sought to answer 
the question of whether he would actually be removed.155 Because it was not 
clear that Guerra would actually be removed while his withholding proceed-
ings were ongoing, the court held that the decision of whether Guerra was to 
be removed or not was still pending.156 The Second Circuit also noted that, 
because 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) focuses on detention in the context of the “removal 
period,” the statute could not govern Guerra’s detention because there was no 
way the Attorney General could remove him as required while his withholding 
application was pending.157 
Both the courts noted that, although Guerra was not free to appeal his un-
derlying removal order, he could appeal the outcome of his withholding-of-
removal proceedings to the Board of Immigration Appeals.158 Both courts also 
noted that, although the Second Circuit had not previously addressed the issue 
directly, precedent in the Circuit indicated that orders of removal should not be 
treated as administratively final during pending withholding-of-removal pro-
ceedings because courts in the Circuit had held that such decisions are not final 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62; Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1. 
 153 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (noting that § 1231 “does not authorize bond hearings”); Guerra 
I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *2 (noting that Guerra would only be eligible for a bond hearing if he were 
detained under § 1226(a), which applies to detentions “before a removal order becomes administra-
tively final”). 
 154 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62 (noting that § 1226(a) does not address theoretical removability, 
but rather determination of actual removal). The court stated that because individuals in ongoing 
withholding proceedings could end up not being removed, they fell within the statutory scope of 
§ 1226(a) rather than § 1231. See id. at 63 (quoting Chupina v. Holder, 570 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 
2009)) (noting that, in the similar context of asylum, an application that is granted on remand “effec-
tively would result in the cancellation of any order removing” an individual). 
 155 Id. at 62. 
 156 See id. at 63 (analogizing the similar context of asylum applications and noting that in the case 
of both asylum and withholding, an individual could be allowed to remain in the United States). 
 157 Id. at 62–63 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)). The text of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) provides that the At-
torney General “shall remove” the individual during the removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 158 Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *3; see Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63 (noting that the parties did 
not dispute that Guerra could appeal the outcome of his withholding claim). The district court noted 
the impact of finding reinstated orders of removal to be administratively final, stating that such a hold-
ing would “raise serious constitutional concerns.” Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (quoting Ortiz-
Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
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for purposes of appellate review.159 The District Court also indicated that the 
majority of federal courts to address the issue held that reinstated orders of 
removal were not administratively final pending a withholding of removal ap-
plication.160 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Affirmance of the District of Idaho’s Decision That 
Reinstated Orders of Removal are not Reviewable 
Padilla-Ramirez also filed a habeas petition in federal court seeking a 
bond hearing and immediate release from custody after his requests for a bond 
hearing were denied.161 Padilla-Ramirez also contended that he was being held 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and was therefore entitled to a bond hearing.162 
The government again argued that because the underlying removal order could 
not be challenged, Padilla-Ramirez was being held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231, and was therefore not entitled to a bond hearing.163 
Reaching the opposite conclusion as that of the Second Circuit, the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Idaho and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, in Padilla-Ramirez I and Padilla-Ramirez 
II respectively, that reinstated orders of removal are administratively final, 
notwithstanding a pending application for withholding of removal.164 Like the 
Guerra courts, the Padilla-Ramirez courts identified the question before them 
as whether an order of removal that was reinstated against an individual with a 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63; Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *5. The courts noted that, in cases 
where individuals sought federal court review of an order of removal, the Second Circuit had previ-
ously determined that a pending withholding application prevented orders of removal from being final 
and thereby reviewable. See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63 (citing Chupina, 570 F.3d at 103) (reasoning 
that the finality required for judicial review is the same as that contemplated in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)); 
Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *5 (citing Chupina, 570 F.3d at 103–04) (noting the similarity be-
tween the finality required for judicial review and the finality required for a bond hearing). Although 
the government argued that the two types of finality were distinct, the Second Circuit did not create a 
difference in the finality required for judicial review of orders of removal, and the finality required 
under § 1231(a). See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63 (noting that the court would “not create new principles 
parsing administrative finality”). 
 160 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4–5 (collecting federal court cases addressing the ques-
tion). The District Court made note of Ortiz-Alfaro, observing that the Ninth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion as the courts in Guerra I and Guerra II. Id. at *4. At the time of the court’s opinion in 
Guerra I, Padilla-Ramirez v. Shanahan had not yet been decided at the district court level. Compare 
Padilla-Ramirez v. Shanahan (Padilla-Ramirez I), 180 F. Supp. 3d 697, 697 (D. Idaho 2016) (noting 
decision date of April 15, 2016), with Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1 (noting decision date of 
December 23, 2014). 
 161 Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829; Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 698. 
 162 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829 (“Padilla-Ramirez argues that he is detained pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).”). 
 163 See id. (“[T]he government contends that Padilla-Ramirez is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a).”); Guerra I, 2017 WL 7330449, at *3 (noting the government’s similar argument). 
 164 Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61; Padilla-Ramirez I, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 698; see Padilla-Ramirez II, 
882 F.3d at 828 (affirming Padilla-Ramirez I). 
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pending application for withholding of removal was administratively final.165 
The courts also recognized that, if Padilla-Ramirez’s reinstated order was ad-
ministratively final, he would not have the right to a bond hearing.166 
The Padilla-Ramirez courts began their analyses in the same way as the 
Guerra courts, by examining the language of the statutes at issue and deter-
mining that the language indicated that Padilla-Ramirez’s detention was au-
thorized pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 because, even if his withholding applica-
tion succeeded, the government could simply remove him to a different coun-
try.167 The courts spent much of their opinions distinguishing Padilla-Ramirez 
from Ninth-Circuit-precedent Ortiz-Alfaro, and explaining the distinction be-
tween administrative finality of the decision to remove an individual and the 
decision of which country the individual would be removed to.168 The Ninth 
Circuit also directly addressed Guerra II and disagreed with almost all of the 
Second Circuit’s analysis of both guiding precedent and the applicable stat-
utes.169 
C. District Courts’ Approaches to the Finality of  
Reinstated Orders of Removal 
Federal District Courts have come to differing conclusions when deter-
mining whether reinstated orders of removal are administratively final.170 The 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829–30 (identifying question before the court as 
whether Padilla-Ramirez was detained pursuant to § 1226(a) or § 1231), and Padilla-Ramirez I, 108 
F. Supp. 3d at 699 (recognizing the same question as the “central issue” in the case), with supra note 
152 and accompanying text (detailing the same question’s recognition by the Guerra courts). 
 166 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 829–30 (noting that if Padilla-Ramirez’s order of removal 
was administratively final, his detention was governed by § 1231(a), and noting that individuals de-
tained under § 1231(a) are not entitled to bond hearing); Padilla-Ramirez I, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 699–
700 (noting that the difference between being detained under § 1226 and § 1231 effects “the kind of 
review process available to [the individual] if [that person] wishes to contest the necessity of . . . de-
tention”). 
 167 Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 830–31; see Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 701 (exam-
ining both statutes and reasoning that it “does not make sense” that Padilla-Ramirez’s detention could 
be pursuant to § 1226(a)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E) (providing for the removal of individuals 
to countries other than those designated in their removal orders); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(f) (2018) (noting 
that, in both withholding under § 1231 and withholding under the Convention Against Torture, the 
government is not prevented from “removing an [individual] to a third country other than the country 
to which removal has been withheld”). 
 168 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 833 (quoting Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 958) (noting that 
Ortiz-Alfaro only applied to finality for judicial review to avoid “serious constitutional concerns”); 
Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 702 (noting that Ortiz-Alfaro’s holding was limited to finality 
“for purposes of judicial review”). 
 169 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 834–36 (disagreeing with the Second Circuit as to the 
purpose of withholding proceedings and the similarities between asylum claims and withholding ap-
plications, and disputing the alleged creation of “tiers of finality” by the Second Circuit’s decision). 
 170 Compare Crespin v. Evans, 256 F. Supp. 3d 641, 650–51 (E.D. Va. 2017) (holding that rein-
stated orders of removal are administratively final and that detention thereunder is therefore governed 
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ambiguous status of law on the issue of the finality of reinstated orders of re-
moval has even led to differing conclusions by judges in the same federal judi-
cial district.171 Many courts addressing this question after Guerra II and Pa-
dilla-Ramirez II have relied on one of those circuit-level decisions as a guide-
post for their own analysis.172 Prior to Guerra II and Padilla-Ramirez II, courts 
addressing the issue of finality of reinstated orders of removal adopted one of 
two basic approaches to answering the question, which led to two differing 
conclusions.173 
Courts that have concluded that reinstated orders of removal are adminis-
tratively final utilized the same approach later employed by the courts in Pa-
dilla-Ramirez I and Padilla-Ramirez II.174 Those courts reasoned that because 
the ongoing withholding-of-removal proceedings were not examinations of the 
underlying orders of removal, but rather considerations of the location of re-
moval, the underlying order remained final.175 Consequently, those courts held 
                                                                                                                           
by § 1231), and Reyes v. Lynch, No. 15-CV-0442, 2015 WL 5081597, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 
2015) (coming to the same conclusion as the Crespin court), with Guerro v. Aviles, No. 14-CV-4367, 
2014 WL 5502931, at *9 (D. N.J. Oct. 30, 2014) (determining that detention of an individual subject 
to a reinstated order of removal is governed by § 1226 because reinstated orders of removal are not 
final), and Pierre v. Sabol, No. 1:11-CV-2184, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) 
(reasoning that reinstated orders of removal are not administratively final). 
 171 Compare Bucio-Fernandez v. Sabol, No. 1:17-CV-00195, 2017 WL 2619138, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 
June 16, 2017) (holding that reinstated orders of removal are administratively final and detention 
thereunder is governed by § 1231), with Rafael Ignacio v. Sabol, No. 1:CV-15-2423, 2016 WL 
4988056, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2016) (holding that reinstated orders of removal are not adminis-
tratively final and that detention thereunder is governed by § 1226), and Pierre, 2012 WL 1658293, at 
*4 (same). 
 172 See, e.g., Villalta v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-05390, 2017 WL 4355182, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 
2017) (“Padilla-Ramirez [II] establishes that Petitioner is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231.”); De Souza Neto v. Smith, 272 F. Supp. 3d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2017) (“The Ninth Circuit 
holds, and this court agrees, that a reinstated removal order is ‘administratively final.’”); Rafael Igna-
cio, 2016 WL 4988056, at *4 (reasoning that a reinstated order of removal was not administratively 
final, “agree[ing] with the [Guerra II] court’s second reason, that the more logical source of authoriza-
tion for the detention of [individuals] currently in withholding-only proceedings is section 1226(a)”). 
 173 Compare Guerrero, 2014 WL 5502931, at *4 (focusing on the availability of appeals from the 
denial of a withholding of removal application to determine that a reinstated removal order could not 
be final while a withholding application was pending), with Reyes, 2015 WL 5081597, at *3 (focusing 
on the fact that, even if a withholding application is successful, the individual can still be removed to a 
different country). 
 174 Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 832 (finding that a reinstated order of removal was 
final because, even if Padilla-Ramirez’s withholding application succeeded, the government could 
simply remove him to a different country), and Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 701–02 (reason-
ing that reinstated orders of removal are administratively final during withholding-of-removal pro-
ceedings because the underlying removal order is not subject to review), with Reyes, 2015 WL 
5081597, at *3 (noting that the government could remove an individual to a different country even if 
that person’s withholding application were successful). 
 175 Reyes, 2015 WL 5081597, at *3. Reyes involved the detention, during withholding-only pro-
ceedings, of a Mexican national who had illegally re-entered the country and had an earlier order of 
removal reinstated. Id. at *1. 
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that detentions of individuals subject to such reinstated orders are governed by 
§ 1231.176 Conversely, courts that held that reinstated orders of removal are not 
final while there is a pending withholding of removal application employed the 
same approach later adopted by the Guerra I and Guerra II courts.177 Those 
courts concluded that because individuals with ongoing withholding of remov-
al applications could not be removed until after those applications were com-
plete, they could not logically be in the removal period.178 Because those 
courts reasoned that such individuals are not within the removal period, the 
courts concluded that the detention of those individuals could not be governed 
by § 1231 and must be governed by § 1226.179 
D. The Number of Immigrants Currently Subject to Detention with 
Questionable Eligibility for Bond Hearings 
The current split between the Second and Ninth Circuits and the related 
ambiguity in federal law as to whether reinstated orders of removal are final 
and non-reviewable has far-reaching implications for the individuals subjected 
to those orders.180 Over one hundred and fifty thousand individuals in the 
United States are subject to reinstated orders of removal every year.181 The 
split regarding the finality of those orders leaves some of those individuals 
without access to a bond hearing while affording others the protection of a 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Bucio-Fernandez, 2017 WL 2619138, at *1, 3 (holding that the eleven-month detention of an 
individual in withholding-only proceedings was governed by § 1231 and that no bond hearing was 
required); Reyes, 2015 WL 5081597, at *6 (holding that the fourteen-month detention of an individual 
in withholding-only proceedings after the reinstatement of an order of removal, was governed by 
§ 1231 and that the individual was not entitled to a bond hearing). 
 177 Compare Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62–64 (reasoning that reinstated orders of removal are not 
final while a withholding-of-removal application is pending because the individual subject to the rein-
stated order cannot be removed), and Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *3–5 (reasoning that reinstated 
orders of removal are not final, because individuals subject to reinstated orders can still seek review of 
their withholding applications), with Rafael Ignacio, 2016 WL 4988056, at *4 (determining that, be-
cause a petitioner’s ongoing withholding-of-removal process sought to determine what country he 
would be removed to, his order of removal could not be final), and Pierre, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4 
(holding that a reinstated order of removal could not be final while an application for withholding of 
removal was pending because there was still a pending decision as to whether the subject of that order 
would be removed from the United States). 
 178 Rafael Ignacio, 2016 WL 4988056, at *4; Pierre, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4. 
 179 Rafael Ignacio, 2016 WL 4988056, at *4 (holding that § 1226 governs an individual’s deten-
tion during withholding-only proceedings related to a reinstated order of removal and that the individ-
ual is entitled to a bond hearing); Pierre, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4 (same). 
 180 See infra notes 181–184 and accompanying text (detailing the number of individuals whose 
access to a bond hearing is currently on questionable footing, and the impact of the denial of a bond 
hearing). 
 181 See Koh, supra note 43, at 203 n.117 (noting that the government reinstated 159,634 orders of 
removal in fiscal year 2013 alone). 
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bond hearing.182 Because bond hearings are among the only ways for an indi-
vidual to be released from detention, the location of a person’s arrest can be the 
difference between more than two years in immigration detention or spending 
that time with family.183 That result is particularly troubling because most indi-
viduals who reenter the United States after being removed have family ties to 
the country in the form of parents or children.184 
III. PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO REINSTATED ORDERS  
OF REMOVAL THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION  
AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
This Part discusses two possible solutions to the current circuit split and 
lack of clarity regarding the finality of reinstated orders of removal.185 Section 
A argues that Congress should act to clarify this area of federal law, explicitly 
state that reinstated orders of removal are not final orders of removal, and 
safeguard the right to a bond hearing for individuals seeking protection in this 
country.186 Section B argues that until Congress clarifies this area of federal 
law, future examining courts should recognize that reinstated orders of removal 
are not final orders of removal, as the Second Circuit properly concluded in 
Guerra II.187 
A. The Need for Clear Congressional Action to Protect Those Rights 
In light of the ambiguity in federal law that caused the split between the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, Congress should recognize that a reinstated order 
of removal is not a final order of removal when the individual who is subject to 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Compare Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *1, 5 (recognizing that Guerra had the right to a 
bond hearing and requiring that it occur within thirteen days), with Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d 
at 702–03 (denying Padilla-Ramirez a bond hearing and therefore requiring that he remain detained). 
 183 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (noting that on the date of the Guerra II decision, two years and 
five months after Guerra was detained by ICE, his withholding-of-removal proceedings were still 
ongoing); Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District 
Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/u.s._federal_courts_circuit_map_1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W3RX-NBLK] (detailing Nevada as part of the Ninth Circuit and New York as 
part of the Second Circuit). Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 828 (denying the right to a bond 
hearing to individuals subject to reinstated orders of removal in the Ninth Circuit), with Guerra II, 831 
F.3d at 61 (recognizing that individuals subject to reinstated orders of removal in the Second Circuit 
have the right to a bond hearing). 
 184 See Koh, supra note 43, at 203 n.117 (noting that roughly sixty-seven percent of individuals 
who reentered the country illegally had older family members living in the United States at the time of 
their reentry, and fifty percent of reentering individuals had children living in the United States at that 
time). 
 185 See infra notes 188–213 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 188–199 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 200–213 and accompanying text. 
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that order has an ongoing withholding proceeding.188 Individuals in that situa-
tion are deserving of Congress’s protection in the form of bond hearings, are 
currently often subjected to prolonged detention, and are at very low risk of 
absconding during their withholding proceedings.189 
Individuals in the position of Guerra and Padilla-Ramirez are deserving of 
Congressional protection for three basic reasons.190 First, those individuals 
have, at the least, articulated a reasonable fear of removal to the country in 
their order of removal.191 Second, they are merely trying to avoid deportation 
to a potentially dangerous environment.192 Finally, most individuals subject to 
reinstated orders of removal have family ties to the United States, and their 
continued detention risks serious consequences for those family members.193 
Without Congressional action, individuals could be subjected to pro-
longed detention.194 This result is especially troubling because these individu-
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez II), 882 F.3d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 2017) (denying 
the right to a bond hearing to individuals subject to reinstated orders of removal in the Ninth Circuit); 
Guerra v. Shanahan (Guerra II), 831 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that individuals subject 
to reinstated orders of removal in the Second Circuit have the right to a bond hearing), aff’g Guerra v. 
Shanahan (Guerra I), No. 14-CV-4203, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014); MICHAEL 
SCAPERLANDA, IMMIGRATION LAW: A PRIMER 5 (2009) (noting that immigration law, although im-
plemented by the Executive Branch, is governed primarily by congressionally enacted statues, leaving 
the power to amend the governing law to Congress). 
 189 See infra notes 191–199 and accompanying text (detailing reasons that individuals in with-
holding proceedings are deserving of the protections afforded by a bond hearing). 
 190 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e) (2018) (noting that all individuals in withholding-only proceedings 
have already articulated a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if removed to the country in the 
underlying removal order); McGarry, supra note 91, at 214 n.39 (detailing the result sought by indi-
viduals in withholding-of-removal proceedings); see, e.g., Excerpts of Record, Volume I of II, Pa-
dilla-Ramirez II, supra note 18, at 14 (noting the negative impact of detention on detainees’ families). 
 191 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e) (noting that, to have a withholding-of-removal case heard by an im-
migration judge, the individual requesting withholding of removal must state a reasonable fear of 
persecution or torture to an asylum officer). 
 192 See McGarry, supra note 91, at 214 n.39 (noting that the positive result of withholding-of-
removal proceedings is, at the least, an order preventing the government from removing an individual 
to the country stated in the order of removal). When an immigration judge grants an individual a bond 
hearing prior to the end of removal proceedings, the individual has a higher likelihood of success 
avoiding removal from the United States. See What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond 
in Immigration Court Proceedings?, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 14, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/438/ [https://perma.cc/Z4GE-7HGT] (noting that in 2015, sixty-eight percent of 
individuals granted bond successfully avoided removal). 
 193 See, e.g., Excerpts of Record, Volume I of II, Padilla-Ramirez II, supra note 18, at 14 (detail-
ing the impact that Padilla-Ramirez’s detention had on his family). For example, while the govern-
ment held Padilla-Ramirez in detention, his eight-year-old son began to punch and kick himself, made 
statements indicating that he did not want to live anymore, and threw himself off a swing set after 
tying his arms in his jacket. Id. Meanwhile Padilla-Ramirez’s six-year-old daughter experienced chest 
pains and outbursts at school, both of which were attributed to stress related to Padilla-Ramirez’s 
detention. Id. at 15. Padilla-Ramirez’s fifteen-year-old daughter also suffered a panic attack because 
of her father’s detention. Id. 
 194 See, e.g., Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (noting that the government detained Guerra for almost 
eleven months before the Guerra I court ordered the government to conduct a bond hearing). Alt-
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als could end up being granted withholding of removal or asylum and allowed 
to remain in the United States.195 As the system is interpreted in the Ninth Cir-
cuit today, individuals deserving of asylum could be detained for more than 
two years.196 
Finally, individuals with pending withholding-of-removal proceedings are 
less likely to abscond while released on bond than others.197 Part of the con-
cern with releasing individuals on bond who are subject to final orders of re-
moval is that those individuals have no incentive to return just to be deport-
ed.198 Although there may be a lack of incentive to return for “regular” indi-
viduals faced with a final order of removal, individuals with pending applica-
tions for withholding of removal have every incentive to abide by the terms of 
bond release.199 
B. Employing Statutory and Regulatory Interpretation to  
Safe-guard the Rights of Unauthorized Immigrants 
Because the statutes currently enacted by Congress do not explicitly an-
swer the question of whether reinstated orders of removal are final orders of 
removal, the questions presented in the Guerra and Padilla-Ramirez cases are 
likely to arise again.200 Under the current statutory and regulatory framework 
                                                                                                                           
hough Guerra’s eleven-month detention ended with the Guerra I decision, had the district court de-
nied him the right to a bond hearing, the government could have held him in detention for up to two 
and a half years because his withholding-of-removal proceedings were still ongoing at the time of the 
Guerra II decision. Id. 
 195 See McGarry, supra note 91, at 214 n.39 (collecting authorities explaining the forms of relief 
available under withholding of removal and asylum). 
 196 See, e.g., Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (noting that Guerra’s withholding-of-removal proceedings 
were still ongoing over two years after ICE first detained him following his release by New York 
authorities). 
 197 See TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 192 (noting that, in cases where individuals obtained 
release after a bond hearing, those individuals were roughly half as likely to abscond as individuals 
that the Attorney General voluntarily released without a bond hearing). 
 198 See id. (responding to concerns about individuals not returning to face deportation after being 
released on bond); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (noting that an order of removal 
becomes final when the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the order or the period to request fur-
ther appellate review expires). 
 199 See TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 192 (noting that, even though the Attorney General 
refused to grant bond, individuals who secured release from immigration detention pursuant to an 
immigration judge’s order were less likely to abscond while out on bond). Individuals facing reinstat-
ed orders of removal with ongoing withholding proceedings have even more reason to abide by the 
terms of their bond than individuals facing original removal actions, because those with ongoing 
withholding proceedings have at least crossed the first hurdle towards having their removal withheld 
by stating a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e) (providing that, before 
an individual’s withholding case is transferred to an immigration judge, the individual must satisfy an 
asylum officer that the individual has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture if returned to the 
country in the removal order). 
 200 See Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 831 (noting that the “statutory definition of finality does 
not dictate a clear answer”); see also Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62 (noting that the “various district courts 
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of immigration orders of removal, futures courts addressing the question of the 
finality of reinstated orders of removal should follow the Second Circuit’s 
holding.201 The language and structure that Congress employed in drafting 
§ 1226 and § 1231—along with the need for judicial consistency—indicates 
that reinstated orders of removal should not be considered final orders of re-
moval.202 
Looking first to the language employed by Congress in § 1226, individu-
als with ongoing withholding-of-removal proceedings and a reinstated order of 
removal more appropriately fit within that statute.203 Section 1226 speaks to 
detention “pending a decision on whether the [individual] is to be removed” or 
not.204 Individuals in Guerra and Padilla-Ramirez’s situation are still awaiting a 
decision as to whether they will be removed.205 Individuals cannot be removed 
prior to the end of their withholding-of-removal proceedings, and it is more 
logical to conclude that a determination regarding their removal is still pend-
ing.206 Unlike § 1226, § 1231 addresses detention during the removal period, a 
                                                                                                                           
to have considered the issue have reached conflicting conclusions”); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster 
of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.D.C. 1987) (Ginsburg, J.) (explaining the precedential value 
of circuit decisions within the circuit); see, e.g., Villalta v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-05390, 2017 WL 
4355182, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (following the reasoning of Padilla-Ramirez II); de Souza 
Neto v. Smith, 272 F. Supp. 3d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2017) (same); Rafael Ignacio v. Sabol, No. 1:CV-
15-2423, 2016 WL 4988056, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2016) (adopting the reasoning of Guerra II). 
 201 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 62–64 (analyzing the text of § 1226 and § 1231, the structure of 
those statutes, and other court decision explicitly or implicitly indicating that reinstated orders of re-
moval are not final orders of removal). 
 202 See id. at 63 (reasoning that there is no difference between finality for purposes of judicial 
review and purposes of immigrant detention); Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (outlining the great-
er number of federal courts that have held that reinstated orders of removal are not final where with-
holding proceedings are pending). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012) (governing detention “pending a 
decision on whether [an individual] is to be removed from the United States”), with id. § 1231(a) 
(providing for detention of an individual “during the removal period”). 
 203 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (providing that, notwithstanding an order of removal, “the Attorney 
General may not remove an [individual] to a country if the . . . [individual’s] life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country”); see also Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 61 (recognizing that individuals subject to 
reinstated orders of removal are eligible for withholding-of-removal proceedings to determine whether 
they will be removed). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (providing for the detention of individuals “pending 
a decision on whether the [individual] is to be removed from the United States”), with id. § 1231(a) 
(providing for the detention of an individual “during the removal period,” when “the Attorney General 
shall detain the [individual]” and “under no circumstance during the removal period shall the Attorney 
General release an [individual]”). 
 204 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (authorizing detention of individuals “pending a decision on whether the 
[individual] is to be removed from the United States”). 
 205 See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible (Padilla-Ramirez I), 180 F. Supp. 3d 697, 701 (D. Id. 2016) 
(noting that while an individual’s withholding-of-removal proceedings are ongoing, the DHS is “re-
stricted from removing” the individual that is the subject of those proceedings). 
 206 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (reasoning that because individuals with pending 
withholding proceedings have the right to appeal the outcome of those proceedings, their removal 
orders cannot be considered final). 
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time during which the Attorney General “shall” remove an individual.207 Be-
cause individuals with pending withholding-of-removal proceedings cannot be 
removed, a statute that requires the Attorney General to remove individuals 
within a certain time should not be read to govern their detention.208 
Judicial consistency also indicates that reinstated orders of removal 
should not be considered final orders of removal, in two distinct ways.209 First, 
finding that reinstated orders of removal with pending withholding-of-removal 
claims are final would create inconsistent standards of finality for judicial re-
view and immigrant detention.210 Because a different standard of finality in 
immigration matters is not consistent with precedent on the issue, and would 
open the door to parsing finality in other areas of law, such a finding should be 
avoided.211 Second, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that in this situation, reinstated orders of removal are not final orders of 
removal.212 In order to provide uniform rights to individuals subject to rein-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (authorizing the Attorney General to detain individuals “pending a 
decision on whether the [individual] is to be removed from the United States”), with id. § 1231 (re-
quiring the detention of individuals who an immigration judge has ordered removed and who “the 
Attorney General shall remove . . . from the United States” within ninety days). 
 208 See id. § 1231 (requiring the detention of an individual who an immigration judge has ordered 
removed during the time when “the Attorney General shall remove” the individual); Rafael Ignacio, 
2016 WL 4988056, at *4 (determining that a pending withholding claim, which prevented the Attor-
ney General from removing an individual, also prevented the reinstated order of removal from becom-
ing final); Padilla-Ramirez I, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 700 (noting that, during withholding-of-removal 
proceedings, the Attorney General cannot remove an individual pursuant to a reinstated order of re-
moval); Pierre v. Sabol, No. 1:11-CV-2184, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (rec-
ognizing that a reinstated order of removal could not be final while the Attorney General was not 
permitted to remove the individual identified in that order). 
 209 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63 (reasoning that there is no difference between finality for judi-
cial review and finality for immigrant detention); Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (outlining the 
greater number of federal courts that have held reinstated orders of removal are not final while with-
holding proceedings are pending). 
 210 See Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 63 (rejecting the government’s argument that finality for judicial 
review and finality for immigrant detention are distinct ideas). 
 211 See id. (noting that no authority indicates a difference in finality for judicial review and immi-
grant detention, and that the court had “never recognized such ‘tiers’ of finality”). Throughout admin-
istrative law, a decision is final for purposes of judicial review when the agency’s decision-making 
process is completed. Id. A decision creating two tiers of finality in the immigration context would 
undermine “principles of administrative law,” potentially leading to the recognition of tiers of finality 
in other areas of administrative law. See id. Individuals in ongoing withholding proceedings are clear-
ly still within the “agency’s decisionmaking process” and therefore the agency decision cannot have 
reached finality. Id. (citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016)). 
 212 See Guerra I, 2014 WL 7330449, at *4 (citing Utlecht v. Napolitano, No. 8:12-CV-347, 2012 
WL 5386618, at *2 (D. Neb. Nov. 1, 2012)) (holding that reinstated orders of removal are not final 
orders while withholding-of-removal proceedings are ongoing); Campos v. Napolitano, No. C 12-
2682, 2012 WL 5379556, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2012) (same); Pierre, 2012 WL 1658293, at *4 
(noting decisions from the United States District Courts for the District of Nebraska, the Northern 
District of California, and the Middle District of Pennsylvania stating that reinstated orders of removal 
are not final orders of removal). 
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stated orders of removal across the country, future courts to confront the issue 
should avoid exacerbating the split.213 
CONCLUSION 
The current circuit split and statutory ambiguity regarding the finality of 
reinstated orders of removal has far-reaching implications for the more than 
one hundred and fifty thousand unauthorized immigrants who reenter the Unit-
ed States after removal every year. Given that the current statutory and regula-
tory framework is ambiguous enough to cause the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second and Ninth Circuits to disagree on the finality of reinstated 
orders of removal in Padilla-Ramirez II and Guerra II, Congress should act. 
Congress should pass legislation explicitly stating that reinstated orders of re-
moval are not final orders of removal while the individual subject to that order 
has a pending withholding of removal application. These individuals are de-
serving of Congress’s protection because they have, at the very least, stated 
reasonable fears of returning to their home countries, are committed to lawful-
ly remaining in the United States, and often have dependent family members 
remaining in the United States. Furthermore, the current lack of clarity regard-
ing the finality of reinstated orders of removal could subject those individuals 
to prolonged detention, only for them to later receive asylum or other relief 
from removal. Unless and until Congress takes such action, future courts 
should employ the analysis used by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit and hold that reinstated orders of removal are not final orders 
of removal. The Second Circuit’s reasoning, embodied in its decision in Guer-
ra II, is more faithful to the text of the governing law, the surrounding statuto-
ry framework, and the consistent application of law across the country. 
JOHN GAVIN 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Compare Padilla-Ramirez II, 882 F.3d at 836 (finding reinstated orders of removal to be final 
orders of removal, thus depriving individuals subject to those orders of the right to a bond hearing), 
with Guerra II, 831 F.3d at 64 (finding reinstated orders of removal not to be final orders of removal, 
thus allowing individuals subject to such orders access to a bond hearing). The current split between 
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit provides one set of 
rights to individuals facing reinstated orders of removal in California and another set of rights to indi-
viduals facing the same thing in Connecticut. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d at 1176 
(noting that circuit court precedent is binding on all district courts in the circuit). Compare Villalta v. 
Sessions, No. 17-CV-05390, 2017 WL 4355182, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (relying on Padilla-
Ramirez II to conclude that reinstated orders of removal were final, even with a pending withholding 
claim), with Enoh v. Sessions, 236 F. Supp. 3d 787, 793–94 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting the fact that the 
Second Circuit had previously determined that reinstated orders of removal were not final pending a 
withholding claim). 
